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Editor’s Note: In June 2015, Preventing Chronic Disease published “How
Do You Know Which Health Care Effectiveness Research You Can Trust? A
Guide to Study Design for the Perplexed,” which used simple graphs and
easy-to-understand text — in 5 case studies — to illustrate how powerful bi-
ases, combined with weak study designs that cannot control for those bi-
ases, yielded untrustworthy findings on influenza vaccination policy, health
information technology, drug safety, prevention of childhood obesity, and
hospital safety (“mortality reduction”) programs. The target audiences for
that article were policy makers, journalists, public health and medical
trainees, and the general public; the primary goal was to explain how weak
or strong study designs fail or succeed in controlling for biases. In the Edit-
or’s Note, we promised to add to those examples of common biases and
research designs to show why people should be cautious about accepting
research results — results that may have profound and long-lasting effects
on health policy or clinical practice, some of which could be detrimental to
health.
In this sixth case study, we revisit one of the most common and danger-
ous threats to research validity: history bias (ie, researchers’ failure to con-
sider relevant events or changes that precede an intervention or co-occur
while it is in progress). Studies that fail to control for history can mislead
policy makers and clinicians. The pay-for-performance policy used to illus-
trate history bias in this article is sensitive to this powerful bias, because
medical practice is always changing as a result of factors unrelated to
policy. Without investigating changes in a study’s hoped-for outcome over
time both before and after the policy or intervention being studied is imple-
mented, investigators will probably attribute those changes to effects of
the policy they are studying, causing billions of dollars of waste implement-
ing such policies worldwide.
Introduction
The ongoing flip-flopping of research findings about the effects of
medical or health policies weakens the credibility of health sci-
ence among the general public, clinicians, members of Congress,
and the National Institutes of Health (1–3). Even worse, poorly de-
signed studies, combined with widespread reporting on those stud-
ies by the news media, can distort the decisions of policy makers,
leading them to fund ineffective, costly, or even harmful policies.
Several reports in top medical journals in 2015 (4–6) pronounced
that economic incentives in Pioneer Accountable Care Organiza-
tions saved medical costs, but the reports did not control for major
biases created by unfairly comparing selected high-performing or-
ganizations with less-experienced control organizations (7). The
result? The US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services cited
the findings as a reason for expanding the program nationwide.
Building on an earlier article in Preventing Chronic Disease (8),
this article focuses on a widely accepted but questionably effect-
ive (9) health policy that compensates physicians for meeting cer-
tain quality-of-care standards, such as measuring or treating high
blood pressure. Policy makers often believe that such financial in-
centives  motivate  physicians  to  improve their  performance to
maintain or increase their incomes, thereby improving patient out-
comes (10).  Health care systems in the United States,  Canada,
Germany, Israel, New Zealand, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom
have committed billions of dollars to this approach in the hope that
such incentives will improve the quality of health care (11). Al-
though this monetary approach sounds good theoretically, interna-
tional scientific reviews overwhelmingly find little evidence to
support it (12). Giving physicians small incremental payments to
do things they already do routinely (eg, measuring blood pressure)
may be counterproductive and even insulting, may divert their at-
tention from more critical concerns, and does not increase quality
of care (13). Some studies even find that such compensation en-
courages unethical behavior by incentivizing doctors to “cherry-
pick” healthy, active, wealthy patients over “costly” sick patients
who are less likely to reach the performance targets. Nevertheless,
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this financial-incentive policy is entrenched in many components
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (colloquially
known as Obamacare), including Accountable Care Organizations,
patient-centered medical homes, and health information techno-
logy (14).
In this article, our aim is to help the public and policy makers un-
derstand how a pervasive bias can undermine the results of poorly
designed studies of pay-for performance programs published in
even the world’s leading medical journals. We also point to obser-
vational study designs and systematic reviews of the total body of
evidence to find more trustworthy conclusions on the efficacy of
pay-for-performance (12). Although randomization is frequently
not  feasible  for  evaluating  such  public  policies  (15),  we  also
present an example of a randomized controlled trial that supports
the conclusions drawn from strong observational study designs.
The Threat: History Bias
The most pervasive threat to the credibility of studies of pay-for-
performance (and many other health interventions) is history bias.
History biases are simple to understand: they are events unrelated
to the policy under study that occur before or during the imple-
mentation of that policy and that may have a greater effect on the
policy’s hoped-for outcome than the policy itself. These events
call into question the conclusions of studies evaluating the policy.
They can be any event, such as a concurrent improvement in phys-
ician practice that successfully identifies and treats patients with
high blood pressure, or widespread news media coverage of a new
drug or new national guidelines supporting a life-saving treatment
(for example, β blockers to prevent acute myocardial infarction
[16]). The American Heart Association’s physician educational
campaign Get With the Guidelines led to a gradual improvement
in hypertension management (17). If a study of a pay-for-perform-
ance program targeting hypertension management  is  launched
after or in the middle of such a campaign and does not account for
that campaign’s effect on any improvements, the pay-for-perform-
ance program may take credit for the success, even though the
blood pressure improvements really resulted from the unmeasured
historical changes in physician practices (18).
Weak pre–post designs that did not control for
history bias
Many studies have evaluated the United Kingdom’s pay-for-per-
formance program — a national policy that provides financial in-
centives to physicians to improve patient care. The largest pay-for-
performance program of its kind, this national policy, introduced
in April 2004, offered family physicians up to an additional 25%
of salary for meeting certain performance standards.
Figure 1 shows data from a study that did not protect against his-
tory bias when it evaluated the United Kingdom’s pay-for-per-
formance program (19,20). The objective of this study was to de-
termine whether the program led to improvements in a set of qual-
ity indicators — measurable elements  of practice that indicate
quality of care (in our example, target total cholesterol levels).
This study had data only for the same month in which the policy
was implemented and 2 points afterwards.
Figure 1. Mean percentage of patients achieving a selected quality indicator —
a target total cholesterol level of ≤5 mmol/L— in a sample of family practices
that participated in a study evaluating the effect of the United Kingdom’s pay-
for-performance policy. Dashed line indicates when the pay-for-performance
policy was implemented (April 2004). Figure is based on data extracted from
Table 2 of Tahrani AA, McCarthy M, Godson J, Taylor S, Slater H, Capps N, et
al. Diabetes care and the new GMS contract: the evidence for a whole county.
Br J Gen Pract 2007;57(539):483–5 (19).
 
Figure 2 shows data from another study that evaluated the United
Kingdom’s pay-for-performance policy. This study also did not
account for secular trends, yet it was published in a major medical
journal and is highly cited (21). The authors’ assessment included
only 2 points in time before and only 2 points after program im-
plementation.
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Figure 2. Mean clinical quality scores for diabetes at 42 practices participating
in a study evaluating the effect of the United Kingdom’s pay-for-performance
policy. The scale for scores ranges from 0% (no quality indicator was met for
any patient) to 100% (all quality indicators were met for all patients). Dashed
line indicates when the pay-for-performance policy was implemented (April
2004).  Figure  is  based on  data  extracted  from Table  1  in  Campbell  SM,
Reeves  D,  Kontopantelis  E,  Sibbald  B,  Roland  M.  Effects  of  pay  for
performance  on  the  quality  of  primary  care  in  England.  N  Engl  J  Med
2009;361(4):368–78 (21).
 
The key problem with both of  these studies,  which purport  to
show the  positive  effects  of  the  national  pay-for-performance
policy, is the use of only 2 data points during a long period before
program implementation and 2 data points afterwards. From so
few data, it is impossible to know what was happening to affect
diabetes scores unrelated to the pay-for-performance policy be-
fore that policy was implemented. So we do not know if any small
changes after policy implementation resulted from the pay-for-per-
formance program or  from some other  changes in  physicians’
practice. If anything, it appears that improvements before imple-
mentation (from 1998 to 2003) — to the extent these are detect-
able by examining only 2 data points — may have lessened or
flattened, not increased after implementation of pay-for-perform-
ance.  These studies are examples of a simple pre–post  design.
Only one or 2 observations (points) before and after pay-for-per-
formance cannot control for secular trends (history) before pro-
gram implementation. The pre-existing trajectory of good quality
of care both before and after the intervention is unknown, and it is
impossible  to  know whether  the  policy had any effect  on this
trend.
Strong interrupted time-series design that controls
for history bias
Figure 3 illustrates a result of one of the most convincingly negat-
ive studies showing that the United Kingdom’s pay-for-perform-
ance had no detectable effects on quality of care for patients with
hypertension. Using a strong interrupted time-series design and 7
years of monthly data (84 time points) for 400,000 patients before
and after the program’s implementation, Serumaga et al showed
that the pay-for-performance program started in the middle of a
slight rise in the percentage of patients who began blood pressure
treatment (22).
Figure 3.  Percentage of  study  patients  who began antihypertensive  drug
treatment from January 2001 through July 2006. Dashed line indicates when
the United Kingdom’s pay-for-performance policy was implemented (April
2004). Figure is based on data extracted from bottom panel,  Figure 3, in
Serumaga B, Ross-Degnan D, Avery AJ, Elliott RA, Majumdar SR, Zhang F, et
al.  Effect  of  pay  for  performance  on  the  management  and  outcomes  of
hypertension  in  the  United  Kingdom:  interrupted  time series  study.  BMJ
2011;342:d108 (22).
 
Every figure in the article shows flat or slightly improving treat-
ment over many years and no effect of the $2 billion program that
links family physician’s income to measures of health care quality.
The existence of a long prepolicy trend, established by data for
January 2001 through April 2004, to control for history bias (eg,
pre-existing physician improvements in quality) enabled a valid
assessment of the effect of the policy on changes in the level or
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trend in health outcomes over many years. The stronger study (in-
terrupted time-series design) showed that the United Kingdom’s
pay-for-performance program had no effects, whereas the 2 weak
studies (pre–post design) contributed only to false or exaggerated
hopes.
Figure 4 shows a remarkably similar negative result of paying hos-
pitals for their measured performance. Hospital pay-for-perform-
ance programs and physician pay-for-performance programs are
developed under similar assumptions: linking pay-for-perform-
ance with certain hospital outcomes are expected to motivate hos-
pital leaders to meet targets to maintain or increase their incomes,
thereby improving patient outcomes.
Figure 4. Mortality at 30 days among all hospitals examined before (from first
quarter 2002) and after (through fourth quarter 2009) implementation of a
pay-for-performance  intervention  (Premier  Hospital  Quality  Incentives
Demonstration [HQID]), which targeted 4 conditions beginning in late 2003:
acute myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, and pneumonia, and
patients who underwent coronary artery bypass grafting. Changes at hospitals
participating in the pay-for-performance intervention (Premier) were similar to
changes at hospitals not participating (non-Premier) for all 4 conditions. Figure
is reproduced from Jha AK, Joynt KE, Orav EJ, Epstein AM. The long-term effect
of  premier  pay  for  performance  on  patient  outcomes.  N  Engl  J  Med
2012;366(17):1606–15 with permission from the New England Journal of
Medicine (23).
 
A study by Jha et al (23) used an interrupted-time series design
with a comparison series to investigate differences in patient mor-
tality rates between hospitals participating in a pay-for-perform-
ance program and hospitals not participating. The study compared
data for patients with one of 4 conditions: acute myocardial infarc-
tion, congestive heart failure, and pneumonia, and patients who
underwent coronary artery bypass grafting. The 7-year trends in
30-day mortality for the pay-for-performance and non-pay-for-
performance hospitals almost completely overlapped, leaving little
doubt that the program had no detectable effect on long-term mor-
tality (Figure 4).
It is worth noting, however, that hospitals in the pay-for-perform-
ance program opted into that program and could have already had
better outcomes than non-participating hospitals before the pay-
for-performance program began (ie, they were anticipating the fin-
ancial rewards). But the equivalent trends and pre-program im-
provements in mortality for both study groups makes it less likely
that this bias would have changed the conclusion.
Interestingly, a more recent study of pay-for-performance effects
on 30-day in-hospital mortality rates among patients with pneumo-
nia, heart failure, or acute myocardial infarction in one region of
the United Kingdom was also compromised by already occurring
declines in mortality rates and a lack of clear differences in mor-
tality rates between the study and comparison groups (24). These
short-term declines in mortality rates were not maintained in the
long term (25).
Strongest designs for controlling for history bias:
randomized controlled trials
The strongest design for evaluating policies is a randomized con-
trolled trial (RCT). In such study designs, random allocation of
participants into intervention and control groups increases the like-
lihood that the only difference between the group receiving the
pay-for-performance intervention and the control group (the one
not participating in pay-for-performance) is the intervention itself.
In a recent RCT, physicians randomized to a pay-for-performance
intervention were eligible to receive up to $1,024 per patient who
met target cholesterol levels, whereas physicians in the control
groups received no economic incentives for achieving better out-
comes (26).
Studies with strong, trustworthy designs, such as this RCT, sug-
gest that paying physicians according to their measured perform-
ance on quality metrics (eg, reduction in low-density lipoprotein
levels)  does not  improve outcomes (Figure 5).  Physician pay-
ments did not produce any meaningful changes in quality of care
compared with an equivalent group receiving no incentives.
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Figure 5. Mean low-density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol levels at baseline and
12-month follow-up in an intervention (pay-for-performance) group (in which
incentives  were  provided to  physicians)  and a  control  group (no  pay-for-
performance).  The  intervention  was  conducted  from 2011 to  2014 in  3
primary care practices in  the northeastern United States.  Patients in  the
control group achieved a mean reduction of 25.1 mg/dL in LDL cholesterol
levels from a baseline of 161.5 mg/dL. Patients in the pay-for-performance
group achieved a mean reduction of 27.9 mg/dL from a baseline of 159.9
mg/dL.  The  difference  between  the  2  groups  was  neither  statistically
significant nor clinically meaningful. Figure is based on data extracted from
Asch DA, Troxel AB, Stewart WF, Sequist TD, Jones JB, Hirsch AG, et al. Effect
of  financial  incentives  to  physicians,  patients,  or  both  on  lipid  levels:  a
randomized clinical trial. JAMA 2015;314(18):1926–35 (26).
 
Rigorous systematic reviews of the entire body of
pay-for-performance studies: the most trustworthy
evidence
It is important to reiterate that no study is perfect, and no single
study can determine the truth, whatever that may be. The accumu-
lation of knowledge over time is the best way to assess a health
care treatment or policy. However, given that most studies do not
control for history or other biases, it is essential to single out the
most rigorous systematic reviews — literature syntheses that elim-
inate weakly designed studies (the simple pre–post study designs
illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2 or studies that simply correlate
pay-for-performance with quality of care at one point in time) and
summarize the remaining evidence.
One international systematic review (Box) (12) found that not only
was there little evidence to support pay-for-performance’s effects
on quality of medical care, some studies found that it sometimes
had the unintended consequence of discouraging doctors from
treating the sickest patients.
Box. Conclusion of International Study by Houle et al in Annals of Internal
Medicine, 2012: Does Performance-Based Remuneration for Individual
Health Care Practitioners Affect Patient Care?: A Systematic Review (12)
Although uncontrolled before–after studies suggested that P4P [pay for
performance] improves adherence to quality-of-care indicators for chronic
illnesses . . . higher-quality studies with contemporaneous control groups
or analyses that considered secular trends failed to confirm these
benefits. Most important, 4 large interrupted time series analyses
conducted in the United Kingdom to evaluate the effect of their primary
care P4P scheme introduced in 2004 found that quality scores for
incentivized indicators were increasing for patients . . . before P4P began;
there was no convincing evidence that the quality of care increased at a
faster rate in the 3 years after P4P implementation than before.
[T]he current evidence for P4P targeting individual practitioners is
insufficient to recommend wholesale adoption in health care systems at
this time.
In addition to the international systematic review, other recent
well-conducted systematic reviews supported the conclusion that
questions the efficacy of pay-for-performance and advised against
its widespread implementation — which has occurred despite the
negative evidence (27). For example, Dutch researchers conduc-
ted an “umbrella review” — a review of all systematic reviews on
pay-for-performance policies— to consider the totality of the evid-
ence (28). They found that most systematic reviews unequivoc-
ally concluded that evidence showing effectiveness for pay-for-
performance policies  is  weak,  mixed,  and inconclusive;  many
studies failed to find a meaningful effect attributable to the policy.
As we have illustrated in this article, studies with weak designs
that do not control for biases found more positive results than
those with strong designs (29).
Closing Comments
Despite its unfulfilled promise and discouraging evidence, this
costly and ineffective approach to improving health care is a wide-
spread component of current national and international health care
policies. It is entrenched in many policies created by the Afford-
able Care Act (14). Part of the problem is the explosion in statist-
ical techniques that attempt to “adjust for” or “correct” unques-
tionably  dissimilar  study  and  comparison  groups  rather  than
graphing the actual data over time so policy makers (who appreci-
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ate simple graphical displays) can actually look at the size of ef-
fects. Exaggeration of the effects of government programs through
such “black box” statistics by the news media further widens the
divide  between  reality  and  perception  of  policy  effects  (30).
Weakly designed studies may also facilitate the proliferation of
policies that encourage physicians to achieve “target rates” for
health care procedures even when these procedures may be harm-
ful for some patients. Oftentimes, what’s measured is what mat-
ters, and quality may deteriorate in areas that are not incentivized
(31). Pay-for-performance programs may even result in collateral
damage (13), diverting resources from under-resourced facilities
such as safety net hospitals that provide care for vulnerable and
high-need populations (32).
If we wish to encourage efficiency in medicine when our govern-
ment and private health care programs are consuming almost one-
fifth (17%) of the gross national product, it may be time to insist
on strong experimental and quasi-experimental research designs
(such as RCTs, interrupted time-series designs, and systematic re-
views) in pilot tests of expensive policies. Investments of private
and taxpayer funds should be based on solid evidence of safety
and efficacy. The alternative, the present system, relies on weak
and uncontrolled research designs, misleads policy makers and the
public, and will ultimately lead to perverse effects, such as unsus-
tainable costs, unhappy clinicians, and policies that may damage
rather than improve the quality of medical care (30).
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